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This paper presents a three-sector static model to explore 
the rationale for a series of institutional distortions in 
developing countries. The authors argue that, after World 
War II, motivated by a belief in the development of state-
of-the-art industries as a means for nation building, the 
majority of developing country governments attempted 
to accelerate the growth of advanced capital-intensive 
industries. However, since developing countries are 
relatively rich in labor or natural resource endowments 
but not in capital endowment, advanced capital-
intensive industries were not adapted to the endowment 
structures of these developing countries at the time. 
Enterprises in those industries were non-viable in open, 
This paper—a product of the Development Economics Vice Presidency—is part of a larger effort in the World Bank  to 
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competitive markets and could not survive without 
government subsidization or protection. The model 
shows that, in order to mobilize resources into the 
capital-intensive, advanced sectors, it is necessary for 
governments to use distortionary policies such as taxes 
and subsidies, distortions of factor prices, directive 
allocation of resources, and nationalization of enterprises. 
Such distortions enable developing countries to set up 
advanced, capital-intensive industries in the early stage of 
their development. However, they also tend to suppress 
incentives, misallocate resources, and make the economy 
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Many distortions exist simultaneously in developing countries—such as preferential 
taxes and subsidies to certain industries, financial repression, over-valuation of 
domestic currencies, rationing of capital and foreign exchange, administration-created 
monopolies, and state ownership. These distortions often lead to poor economic 
performance, low living standards, and even frequent crises in developing countries. 
There is, however, no consensus about their origins.   
 
Some economists have provided an “interest group” explanation (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu, 2007). This view 
emphasizes the economic or political benefits to particular interest groups from the 
distortions, and these groups have enough political influence to force the government 
to adopt distortional arrangements that are favorable to them. This view is insightful 
because powerful interest groups in developing countries are associated largely with 
capital-intensive, advanced sectors, which gain the most government protection. 
However, the view is inconsistent with the fact that at the time when the protections 
were first introduced, the most powerful interest group in many developing countries 
was the landed class. The protections hurt the landed class. Moreover, although the 
powerful industrial group gains from the protections, it loses from other distortions, 
for example, the widely observed state ownership in advanced industries in 
developing countries. Gordon and Li (2005a, 2005b) provide an alternative, “public 
finance” explanation that suggests that developing country governments’ regulation 
and distortions were designed to alleviate problems with tax collection. The authors 
argue that since there is a large un-taxable underground economy in developing 
countries, it is desirable for governments to mobilize resources to support the 
development of sectors that are easier to tax in order to increase government revenue. 
According to Gordon and Li, the observed protection of formal, advanced sectors is 
instituted for this purpose. They did not, however, explain why the government 
wanted to collect the taxes and how the tax revenue was used. In fact, in many 
developing countries, the taxes collected from the advanced, modern sectors often 
amount to less than the subsidies provided to them. In addition, Gordon and Li do not 
provide an explanation for the existence of other types of regulations and distortions 
in developing countries, such as distortions in factor markets and state ownership of 
large-scale modern enterprises. 
 
Lin et al. (1995, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2009) propose an alternative explanation for the 
complicated regulations and distortions in developing countries. After World War II, a 
large number of colonial or semi-colonial countries won political independence. 
Compared with developed countries, these developing countries lagged far behind 
economically. It was high on every developing country government’s agenda to 
develop the economy as quickly as possible to achieve rapid economic take-off and 
eliminate poverty. At that time, national leaders and social elites in socialist and 
non-socialist developing countries shared a common belief in the development of 
  2state-of-the-art technologies and industries as the best means of modernization. They 
aimed to catch up with and avoid exploitation by developed countries and to become 
economically and politically independent of developed countries. They therefore 
pursued the development of advanced heavy industries—the state-of-the-art industries 
at that time—and implemented development strategies that attempted to accelerate 
their development. However, advanced, capital-intensive industries were not 
consistent with the comparative advantages determined by their endowment 
structures—characterized either by labor abundance or resource abundance. Such a 
comparative advantage-defying (CAD) strategy
1  made enterprises in the 
government’s CAD industries non-viable in open, competitive markets.
2 Because of 
the CAD strategy, developing country governments were obliged to provide the 
non-viable firms with various subsidies and protection. 
 
Theoretically, a developing country government could subsidize non-viable 
enterprises in the CAD industries by fiscal transfers with explicit taxes collected from 
other economic sectors. The required amount of taxation or subsidization would 
depend, however, on the size of the CAD industries: if they were small, subsidization 
through fiscal transfer would suffice.
3 In reality, the capital level in the endowment 
structure of a developing country will be too small, the size of the CAD industries is 
often too large, and fiscal transfers alone will not be enough to compensate for the 
likely losses of the non-viable enterprises in the CAD industries. Facing this 
constraint, a government will have to make other institutional arrangements to 
implement this strategy. 
 
One often-observed measure undertaken in a developing country is the distortion of 
factor prices—such as suppression of interest rates and over-valuation of domestic 
currencies—in order to reduce the costs of investment and imports of technology and 
equipment for non-viable enterprises. Such distortions result, however, in excess 
demand for those factors whose prices are suppressed. As a result, the government 
needs to use planned, administrative measures to guarantee allocation of those factors 
to the non-viable enterprises in the CAD industries (Lin, 2003, 2009). 
 
When factor prices are distorted, the non-CAD industries—such as light industry and 
agriculture—will yield higher returns to the factors than the CAD industries and it 
will be profitable to reallocate resources from the CAD industries to other industries. 
If enterprises are owned and run by private agents, such arbitrage is likely. To avoid 
                                                        
1  Similar to the definition in Rodrick (2005), the development strategy here refers to economic policies 
and institutional arrangements aimed at achieving the government’s development goals. 
 
2  As defined by Lin (2003), a normally managed firm is viable if it earns a socially acceptable 
expected profit without external subsidization or protection in a competitive market. According to Lin, 
the viability of a firm is determined by whether its choice of technology/product/industry is consistent 
with the specific characteristics of the economy’s endowment structure. 
 
3  Agricultural subsidies in developed countries are an example of this case. 
  3this, developing country governments often nationalize the enterprises in the CAD 
industries in order to strengthen their control over the use of resources.   
 
The major hypothesis in this paper is that there is a positive relationship between the 
degree of economic distortions and the degree of deviation of the CAD strategy from 
the optimal industrial structure determined by the country's endowment structure. The 
larger the CAD industry, the more distortions will be needed—and loss of efficiency 
and social welfare will be greater.     
 
Compared with former works, this paper makes two contributions: 1) it provides an 
alternative, consistent explanation for the existence of a series of distortions in 
developing countries; and 2) it shows how those distortions work together to achieve 
the developing country governments’ goal of developing CAD industries. Lin and 
Zhang (2007) is a pioneering work modeling this idea; our paper is different in basic 
assumptions and in the emphasis on the interaction of various distortions. 
 
In the next section, we set the economic environment of developing countries in 
which the government pursues a CAD strategy. Section 3 shows how economic 
distortions are combined to build an environment that supports the development of 
nonviable industry. Section 4 shows that institutional distortions are a function of the 
government’s CAD strategy. Section 5 provides some other implications of the CAD 
strategy for institutional distortions. Section 6 concludes the paper with some 
remarks. 
 
2. Baseline Model 
2.1 Environment 
Consider a small, open economy with three sectors: agriculture (Sector 1), light 
industry (Sector 2), and heavy industry (Sector 3). The production of each type of 
good requires inputs of both capital and labor. Total capital  , 
where    is capital input in the agriculture,    is capital input in light industry, and 
  is capital input in heavy industry. Similarly, we have total labor 
. Factors cannot flow internationally. We define the level of 
endowment structure in the economy by per capita capital,  . That is, the 
higher per capita capital, the higher the development structure in the economy. The 
goods prices    are given by the international market. 
 
The production functions are Cobb-Douglas functions: 
                 ( 1 )  
where  , and    is the level of productivity in sector    in the economy. 
tion 
The key difference among these sectors is in capital intensity. The production of 
heavy industry is more capital intensive than that of light industry, and the produc
of light industry is more capital intensive than that of agriculture. The Cobb-Douglas 
form is adopted for simplicity. 
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The indirect utility function of the representative agent is 
                   ( 2 )  
where    is the price vector, and   
 
is the total output value of the economy.    is non-increasing and strictly convex. 
n the policy side, there are activity-specific tax rate 
This quasi-linear utility function form is adopted for simplicity. 
 
O , and subsidy rate   on 
production, which are constrained to be nonnegative. Let the set of protected sectors 
be denoted by   and unprotected sectors by 
4. The tax and subsidy make the 




There are no other fiscal instruments (in particular, no lump-sum non-distortional 




market-clearing levels by a rate of  , and a corresponding directive allocation system 
directly mobilizes resources into protected sectors at lower prices. 
 
These activities are financed by the government’s tax revenue. The costs of these 
he former part of the costs is increasing in the amount of resources to be allocated 
activities mainly consist of two parts: one arises from mobilizing resources into 
protected sectors and the other arises from supervising the utilization of resources in 
protected sectors. While factor prices are suppressed, it is profitable for a producer in 
a protected sector to take the opportunity of arbitrage by transferring resources to 
unprotected sectors, since these resources are directly allocated to them at prices 
lower than the market levels. So in addition to simply mobilizing resources, one of the 
most important functions of the directive allocation system is to prevent producers in 
protected sectors from taking this arbitrage opportunity. The government has to 
supervise the producers in protected sectors to make sure the resources directly 




directly. The latter part of the costs is increasing in  . The reason for this is that the 
larger    is, the larger the incentive for arbitrage is, so the government has to increase 
the inte sity of supervision as  n  increases. Let   denote the output of protected 
                                                        
4   
  5sectors while the government does not intervene in the economy, that is, 
. Thus we characterize these costs as 
 
where    measures the intensity of supervision, and 
 
measures the amount of resources allocated directly by the difference between the size 
of protected sectors with distortions and those without distortions.   is 
non-decreasing and strictly convex, satisfying the conditions that  , 
 and  . 
opment  the governm The devel  strategy of ent is a sum of policies  . Under 
its development strategy, the government’s budget constraint is
5 
   (3) 
Instead of paying attention to the total output value of the economy, the governm   ent
places a weight    on the output value of sectors it favors and a weight   on  the 
output value of the others, where    is nonnegative, that is,  . The government’s 
objective function is in the following form
6 
       ( 4 )  
It is clear that the government’s objective function    is a monotonic transformation 
of the consumer’s utility function   if   or   with the implication that 
the government prefers none of these three sectors. 
 
2.2 Economic Equilibrium without Distortions 
m for a given set of policies  We first characterize the economic equilibriu
. An economic equilibrium is defined as the wage rate and the interest rate 
, and investment and employment levels for all sectors  , such that 
  given  and  , all producers choose their investment and 
employ ly and  or market and the capital market clear. 
 
ment optimal the lab
ach producer takes the wage and interest rate as given. Firms simply maximize net  E
profits. Consequently, the optimization problem of each firm can be written as 
 and  
                                                        
5  We assume away usual items in the government's budget constraint such as a public expenditure, the 
cost of operating the tax system, etc., as they are not related to the CAD strategy. This simplification 
does no harm to our analysis. 
6  This objective function is consistent with a more intuitive form 
 
We adopt the current form for simplicity. 
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This maximization yields 
        ( 5 )  
and 
    ( 6 )  
    ( 7 )  
where   denotes the profit from one unit of product and   the average cost of 
production. Combining (5), (6), and (7) with the resource constraints 
        ( 8 )  
and  
            ( 9 )  
we can obtain the economic equilibrium. It is straightforward that without distortions, 
which sectors the economy specializes in depends on its endowment structure. As the 
capital level in the endowment structure increases, producers will enter relatively 
more capital-intensive sectors. 
 
In order to exclude the trivial case where Sector 2 is dominated by a combination of 
Sector 1 and Sector 3, we assume that compared with   and  ,   is large 
enough to satisfy the condition 
 
We therefore have (proof in the appendix): 
 
Proposition 1:   
Suppose assumption (A1) and the conditions  ,   
and    hold. The economic equilibrium is as follows: 
 if  , then  ; 
 if  , 
 then  ; 
if  , 
then  ; 
if  , 
then ; 
if  , then  . 
 
  7Note that the above economic equilibrium also maximizes the social welfare function 
. 
 
3. Economic Equilibrium under CAD Strategy 
In this section, we begin to discuss how governments in developing countries make 
use of economic distortions to implement a CAD strategy. We show how the 
government changes the economic environment so that CAD industries can survive, 
and calculate the resulting economic equilibrium under CAD strategy. 
 
We characterize the situation of developing countries as Case 2, where agriculture and 




Consider a government pursuing a CAD strategy that supports heavy industry, the 
CAD industry, both by lowering its factor prices and by taxing agriculture and light 
industry. It immediately follows that  ,  , and  , and that the 
CAD strategy becomes   and the government’s policy set boils 
down to  . 
 
As shown in Proposition 1, without distortions only Sector 1 and Sector 2 are invested. 










  8measuring the non-viability of firms in Sector 3 in such an economic environment
7. 
The larger    is, the more difficult it is for Sector 3 to survive. Thus it also represents 
the difficulty for the government in supporting Sector 3. 
 
Since when    the government pays special attention to the size of Sector 3, it is 
desirable for the government to set up an economic environment in which heavy 
industry will survive
8. In this paper we focus on those economic environments in 
which each of the three sectors is invested
9. 
 
Given  , according to (7) the policy set    has to satisfy the conditions 
 
It immediately follows that 
      ( 1 0 )  
and 
        ( 1 1 )  
and 
            ( 1 2 )  
 
Inspection of (10), (11), and (12) reveals that each of these three policy instruments 
contributes to build an economic environment favorable to production in Sector 3. 
While subsidization increases the producer price of Sector 3, both taxation and factor 
price regulation reduce its factor prices. 
 
In addition, If polices    are large enough to satisfy the condition 
 
then firms in Sector 3 get the same zero profit as those in Sector 1 and Sector 2. Thus 
condition (SC) is a necessary condition for an economic environment in which firms 
in Sector 3 can survive. Summarizing the analysis (proof in the text): 
                                                        
7  By assumption (A1) it is straightforward to verify  . 
8  A firm survives if it can earn acceptable profits as other firms in the economy. A nonviable firm can survive with 
government subsidies. 
9  Although other economic environments are theoretically possible, in practice almost no developing country 
governments have pursued the CAD strategy to the extent that agriculture, industry, or light industry is not 
invested. In addition, this simplification does no harm to our analysis of the mechanism of institutional distortions. 
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Lemma 1: 
Suppose assumption (A1) holds. Then each of the three sectors gets zero profit, if 
policies   satisfy  condition  (SC). 
 
We proceed to characterize the economic equilibrium under the environment in which 
the set of polices    satisfies condition (SC). Substituting (5) into (8), we obtain 
 
Combining the above expression with (9), (10), and (11), equilibrium labor 
allocations are obtained as follows: 
   (13) 
By assumption (A2), the right side of this expression is positive, which ensures 
nonnegative solutions for   and  . We therefore have (proof in the text): 
 
Lemma 2: 
Suppose assumptions (A1) and (A2) and condition (SC) hold, then in equilibrium 
(10) and (11) hold, and 
    (14) 
     (15) 
        (16) 
The first observation is that the equilibrium is indeterminate, for in equilibrium there 
are three sectors producing but only two factors in the economy. Moreover,   is 
increasing in   while    is decreasing in  . This reflects the fact that, in terms of 
employment, Sector 1 and Sector 3 are complementary while Sector 2 and Sector 3 
are substitutes. 
 
However, as the government’s policies are financed by the taxes collected from Sector 
1 and Sector 2, not all the equilibrium value of   in  the  interval   is  available 
for the government. In order to find the size of Sector 3 that can be supported by the 
government’s budget constraint, we take the government’s budget constraint into 
account. Under the CAD strategy   the government’s budget 
constraint (3) can be rewritten as 
 
where we take into account  . 
 
Simplifying the above expression by (9) and the properties of the Cobb-Douglas 
  10production function, we have 
    ( 1 7 )  
The above expression shows that the government’s budget constraint implies a 
positive relationship between   and  . Intuitively, as the size of Sector 3 increases, 
the government needs more tax revenue to finance both the subsidy and the directive 
allocation system for Sector 3. As a result, the size of Sector 2 has to increase to 
enlarge the resources that can be taxed. 
 
By (13) and (17), the level of employment in Sector 3 that can be supported by the 
government’s budget constraint can be expressed as a function of the set of policies 
 
    ( 1 8 )  
By substituting condition (SC) into (18) to eliminate  ,   is reduced to be a 
function of   and   
      ( 1 9 )  
The first interesting feature is that   is increasing in t. Intuitively, taxation 
contributes to the development of Sector 3 in two ways: first, it suppresses the factor 
price rate, and second, it increases tax revenue. Moreover,   affects   in two 
opposite ways: first, it increases   by suppressing the factor price from its 
market-clearing level, and second, it decreases   by increasing the government’s 
expenditure through  . This discussion is summarized in the following 
proposition (proof in the text). 
 
Proposition 2: 
Suppose assumptions (A1) and (A2) and condition (SC) hold. Then the economic 
equilibrium supported by the government’s budget constraint (3) is given by (14), 
(15), (16), and (19).   
 
4. Institutional Distortions under CAD Strategy 
In this section, we show how institutional distortions are combined to implement a 
CAD strategy as described in the above section. To illustrate the mechanism in the 
simplest possible way, we will focus on a subset of the parameter space and abstract 
from other interactions. Throughout, we assume that there is an upper bound on 
taxation, so that  . This limit can be institutional, or it may arise because of the 
ability of producers to hide their output or shift into informal production
10. 
                                                        
10  In reality, there are many limits that impose an upper limit on taxation because high taxation rates 
might not lead to high taxation revenue. First, as the taxation rate rises, it is more difficult to collect 
taxes and the costs of tax collection increase. Second, the tax base will become smaller as the taxation 
rate rises. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, taxation will decrease the returns to factors and 
  11 
The timing of the events is as follows: first, polices are set; then, investments are 
made. An institutional equilibrium is defined as a set of policies   that  satisfies 
(3) and maximizes the government’s objective function, taking the economic 
equilibrium as a function of the set of policies as given. 
 
While  ,  , and  , according to (4) the government’s objective 
function can be written as 
    ( 2 0 )  
By combining (1), (5), (10), (11), (14), and (15), it can be shown that 
       ( 2 1 )  
          ( 2 2 )  
where the total output value of Sector 1 and Sector 2 is decreasing in  , while the 
output value of Sector 3 is increasing in  . Based on this tradeoff, the government’s 
target employment in Sector 3 is calculated as 
 
with (21) and (22). The first-order condition for an interior solution can be expressed 
as 
 
  and we immediately obtain 
     ( 2 3 )  
As expected, the employment in Sector 3 demanded by the government   is 
increasing in  , which is the weight placed on the output value of Sector 3. 
 
Before we characterize the institutional equilibrium, it is useful to calculate the 
maximum   that can be supported by policy. Maximization of (19) gives the 
optimal choice 
11 and the maximum  . It is straightforward to see that 
since   is increasing in  , the tax rate will be set as high as possible, so  . 
                                                                                                                                                               
decrease the efforts of workers and capacity utilization; and, on the other hand, taxation could push 
resources out of the formal economy and underground because of the weakness of institutions in 
developing countries. 
11  In fact, only   and   are determined by this maximization. Given  ,   is obtained by 
condition (SC) as   
. 
  12Consequently    satisfies the first-order condition
12 




Based on (19), (23), and condition (SC), the institutional equilibrium is determined. 
We start with a simple case where factor price regulation is not necessary for 
implementing CAD strategy; that is, we have   in equilibrium. Note that while 
 and    , by (19) 
 
Then combining the above expression with (23), we immediately have that 
 
if and only if 
 
Observing the above inequality, we know that it holds while   or   is relatively 
small but   is relatively large. Intuitively, compared with its taxation capacity, if the 
government places less weight on its CAD strategy, or if the viability of the supported 
sector is not very weak, then taxation and subsidization will be enough to implement 
its CAD strategy and there is no need for factor price regulation and the 
corresponding directive allocation system. 
Setting (18) equal to (23), we have   
 
Combined with condition (SC), the above expression gives the following institutional 
equilibrium   
                                                        
12  Here we assume that m(τ) is so convex that for  , 
 
then we have 
 
13    In this paper we focus on the case where the largest size of Sector 3 that can be supported by 
polices does not reach the upper bound, that is  . This implies that    should be small enough to 
satisfy the following condition 
  
  13 
and 
 




Although in equilibrium a spectrum of policy sets are all theoretically optimal, the 
policy set with   is of the greatest practical significance. The reason is that it 
allows the CAD strategy to be implemented totally by the already existing tax system, 
without introducing other institutions into the economy. The above discussion is 
summarized in the following proposition (proof in the text): 
 
Proposition 3: 
Suppose assumptions (A1) and (A2) and condition (SC) hold. Then when 
 
factor price regulation and the corresponding directive allocation system are not 
necessary for implementing CAD strategy, and there exists an institutional 







It is interesting to make some comparative static analysis. In this case, we find that as 
 increases,   increases but   decreases. An increase in   results in an increase in 
tax revenue, which, combined with the decrease in  , enables the government to 
subsidize more production in Sector 3. Moreover, as expected, both   and   are 
increasing in  , which reflects the fact that Sector 3, with higher production cost, 
requires more protection both from taxation and subsidization. 
 
By contrast, when   or    is so large or    is so small that it satisfies condition   
                                                        
14  By (25), condition   requires 
 
We assume that    is convex enough to ensure that there exists such a    that (*) holds for 
. By (25), condition   requires 
 
Let   denote the value of   which makes (**) equal. Then (**) holds for  . Thus we have 
. 
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we have  . Consequently, all the policies will be used to the extent that they 
maximize  , that is, the institutional equilibrium is  . 
 
According to (24), we have 
 
The above expression shows that if the capacity for taxation is large relative to the 
difficulty in supporting Sector 3, then factor price regulation is more intensive. The 
reason for this is straightforward. As by condition (SC), 
 
that is,   becomes a better substitute for   in satisfying condition (SC) when 
  increases, then more revenue will be spent on factor price regulation rather 
than subsidization. This result is consistent with the “resource curse.” In those 
countries with more resources to be taxed, the governments tend to impose more 
intensive factor price regulation on the economy to implement their CAD strategy. 
The result is worse economic performance (Lin 2009). 
 
To complete the analysis, we at last consider the case where 
 
In this case, by (19) and (23) we have 
 
Therefore we have an institutional equilibrium where   and   satisfying 
the condition   
 




We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: 
Suppose assumptions (A1) and (A2) and condition (SC) hold. Then when 
 
  15factor price regulation and the corresponding directive allocation system are 





Figure 1 shows the relationship between institutional distortions and the CAD strategy 
described in Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. In the first area we depict the problem of 
government.  ,   and  , based on the government’s objective function (20), are 
indifference curves. These indifference curves are different in  , and we have 
. The curve  , based on (21) and (22), represents the economy’s feasible 
set, which is a trade-off between  .  We depict   in the 
second area and    in the fourth area. As shown in the figure,   is  increasing  in   
and  , and gets its largest value when   and  . 
 
Economic equilibrium is the point at which the indifference curves are tangential to 
the feasible set, while the institutional equilibrium is given by the points on the curves 
 and   corresponding to the points of economic equilibrium on curve  . As   
becomes larger, the indifference curve moves upward, resulting in a larger size of 
Sector 3 and a larger   or  . While    is small, only taxation is employed, that is, 
 and  . If   is so large that   reaches  , then factor price regulation 















t   t 
  
* 
3 O  
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Figure 1: Institutional Distortions and CAD Strategy 
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5. Implications for Other Distortions 
Many other institutional distortions make sense once the government’s CAD strategy 
is taken into account. It has been widely recognized that enterprises in developing 
countries suffer from poor performance because of poor management. However it is 
common in developing countries to find, mostly in capital-intensive industries, such 
distortions as government ownership, direct government operation, investment 
censing, etc. These distortions share the feature that the government to some extent 
pe  if the producers are 
li
deprives the enterprises of autonomy in production. 
 
Without autonomy in production, producers have less incentive to improve firm 
rformance. The result will be lower productivity in Sector 3
deprived of autonomy in production. Let    denote the productivity of Sector 3, and 
  denote the non-viability of Sector 3, when its producers are 
on. Then we have    deprived of autonomy in producti
 
and condition (SC) changes into 
 
That is, Sector 3 becomes more non-viable with deprivation of autonomy, and more 
institutional distortions are required for firms in Sector 3 to survive. In this way, even 
 terms of the CAD strategy, it is not useful for the government to deprive the 
ish those who transfer resources. The costs 
volved supervision account for a considerable part of the government’s expenditure 
ring the intensity of 
supervision 
in
producers in Sector 3 of production autonomy. 
 
However, the other side of the coin is optimistic. As shown in Section 2, in order to 
make sure the resources directly allocated are used in Sector 3, the government has to 
supervise the producers in Sector 3 and pun
in
in running the directive allocation system. 
 
By depriving the producers in Sector 3 of autonomy in production, for example by 
nationalizing firms in Sector 3, the government is able to change the objective of 
producers in Sector 3. As members of government, producers in Sector 3 will take 
into account the benefits of the CAD strategy for the government, instead of simply 
maximizing the net profit of production. As a result, they will have less incentive to 
arbitrage, and the government can reduce expenditure by lowe
. Let   denote the intensity of supervision while producers in 
autonom Sector 3 are deprived of  y in production. Then we have 
 
As shown above, while    it is desirable for the government to introduce other 
policies to increase the size of Sector 3. If the government deprives the producers in 
Sector 3 of autonomy in production, then according to (19) employment in Sector 3 
  17becomes 
    ( 2 5 )  
 h
 
Comparing the above expression and (19), we find that depriving producers of 
autonomy as two effects on the size of Sector 3. The former is the negative effect 
through   and then  ; the latter is the positive effect through  . When the 
negative effect dominates, which means that deprivation of the producers’ autonomy 
in production has more negative effect on productivity than positive effect on 
supervision costs, it is undesirable for the government to nationalize the enterprises in 
Sector 3 and deprive the producers’ autonomies in production. On the contrary, if the 
positive effect dominates, it is desirable for the government to nationalize the 
nterprises in this sector.  e
 
Let   denote the optimal choice of   by the government and   denote the 
maximum    while the enterprises in Sector 3 are nationalized. By (25) we have 
   (26) 
and  
    
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that nationalization only has a first-order 
effect on the intensity of supervision, that is,   
 
where   measures the effect of nationalization on  sity of supervis the inten ion.   is 
nonnegative. Therefore we approximately have that    if and only if 
 
Therefore we have the following proposition (proof in the text): 




 and  
 
it is necessary for the government to increase the size of Sector 3 by depriving 
roducers in Sector 3 of autonomy in production.  p
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we show that if the government wants to develop an industry that is not 
consistent with the comparative advantages of its economy, enterprises in the CAD 
industry will be non-viable and the government will be obliged to provide them with 
subsidies and protection. If the size of the targeted CAD industry is small, the use of 
taxation and subsidization will suffice to achieve the government’s goal. However, if 
the industry is large, other policy distortions will be necessary. There is therefore a 
positive relationship between the degree of economic distortions and the degree of 
deviation of the CAD strategy from the optimal industrial structure determined by the 
country’s endowment structure. The logic in this paper provides a consistent 
explanation for the origin of various institutional distortions observed in many 
developing countries that adopted the import-substitution, capital-intensive, 
eavy-industry-oriented development strategy, which went against the comparative 
advantage of their economies. 
 
h
  19Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
We only give the proofs for Case 1 and Case 2 of Proposition 1. Proofs for the other 
cases are similar. 
 
Given  , using (6) and (7) we have 
   
The Lagrangian function is 
   
The solution to this problem is given by the following optimal conditions 
        
and 
     
Proof of Case 1 
 
If  , then  ,  . In addition, 
we have 
   (27) 
and 
   (28) 
Factor prices    are given by (5) and (27) as 
   (29) 
and 
   (30) 
Substituting (29) and (30) into (28), we have 
  20   (31) 
It is straightforward by assumption (A1) that 
   
Thus while the endowment structure satisfies the condition 
   
we have  . 
 
 
Proof of Case 2 
 
If  , then  , and  .  
 
Similarly, we have 
   (32) 
and 
                        ( 3 3 )  
Factor prices    are given by (32) as 
   (34) 
and 









  21Note that given (34) and (35), (33) holds under assumption (A1). According to (5), 
(34), and the resource constraints, resource allocation  ) boils down to 
the solution of a set of equations: 
   
 
The results of employment are 
   
 
As  , we obtain immediately 
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